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Professor Ito, in his draft titled “Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific” and U. S.
Interests”, points out how regionalism has evolved in East Asia, followed by the
contrasting patterns of regional order-making in East Asia, which he argues to be
all subject to and susceptible to U. S. interests in East Asia. In doing so, he draws
a conclusion that a more assertive role is desired of Japan in the “New Asia.”
Although his draft is at its incipient stage, I am dazzled with the scope and
magnitude of his probing into contrasting perspectives on regional order in East
Asia, in particular, and its ramifications in the Asia-Pacific. I am eagerly
anticipating that his final draft will shed some innovative insights into the new era
in which China, Japan, South Korea and U. S. are respectively faced with a
mission to cope with a multitude of issues, both old and new. To improve the
main logic behind his arguments, he will undoubtedly streamline the structure of
arguments which are rather scattered. It will be my utmost privilege if some of
my comments can somehow assist him in refining his writing in the process.
Professor Ito starts with a typology of regionalism in Asia. He first divides
regionalism into the one that grew out of economic cooperation and bloomed into
political and/or security one like the APEC, and the other whose initial political
and/or security needs spread into subsequent economic demands for cooperation
like ASEAN, including the ASEAN plus Three. He then contrasts two sub-
regional frameworks in the region, namely between the ASEAN in consultation
with China, Japan and South Korea, which has been promoted since the 1997
financial crisis, and ASEAN-based cooperation such as the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) or the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), which the
ASEAN countries persistently prioritized over the East Asian imperative. He also
distinguishes the statist or institutionalist tendency to emphasize the importance of
formal institutions in strengthening integration from the so-called “soft” trend to
steer clear from the self-guarding state institutions and instead concentrate on
building informal networks.
Yet it still remains an evasive issue how these intricate configurations of
region are interrelated. Nesadurai (2005), for instance, distinguishes three distinct
types of regionalism: an Asia-Pacific trans-regional one centered on APEC, a
Southeast Asian-led regional one centered on ASEAN and its derivatives like
AFTA and AEC, and an East Asian-led regional one centered on the ASEAN plus
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Three. These configurations of region are not only diverse but also overlapping
in their membership, thus it is only natural to inquire whether these different
regional institutions are competing or complementing one another. Figure 1
illustrates this diverse and overlapping nature of regional configurations in the
Asia-Pacific. In addition to pondering the nature of relationships between these
overlapping regional arrangements, Nesadurai raises a question of how these
diverse regional configurations have an impact on the current U. S. -centered
world order.
Professor Ito, instead, turns his attention to explore how American hegemony
affects these intricately interrelated configurations of region. He points out that
American preponderance pervades regionalism in Asia primarily because there is
no perceived adversary common to all counties in the region and many remain
skeptical about collective security arrangements due to their bitter recollection of
the Japanese aggression both before and during the World War II. These two
characteristics, unique to Asia, perpetuate the intricate networks of U. S. -led
unilateral relationships at the expense of an integrated Asia, thus foreboding a
grim and uncertain future for regionalism in Asia, he argues. However, it is not
entirely clear whether this uncertainty of regionalism in Asia stems from its
inherent two-tier and/or two-speed development, or if American preponderance
debilitates any integrative attempt, which contributes to the intra-regional
animosity. What is certain, nonetheless, is that Asian regionalism has to resolve
the problem of intra-regional reconciliation in order to expedite its multilateral
effort to establish the region-level solidarity or even its regional identity.
To account for this uncertainty about the future of regionalism in Asia,
Professor Ito alternatively chooses to elaborate how regionalism in Asia emerged
and developed since Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, a former prime minister of
Malaysia, proposed the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in 1990. Professor
Ito points out that both the US and other East Asian countries were critical of Dr.
Mahathir’ s proposal but stops short of elaborating why regionalism in Asia
provoked skepticism across the Asia-Pacific region. It is easier to figure out that
the US was reluctant to yield its leverage over the region and thus criticizing a
separate track of regionalism. Yet it is not necessarily clear whether other East
Asian countries were positive about the membership itself, which was never
specified, or its legal binding power―to be more precise, its lack of impact.
In this context, Professor Ito also stops short of clarifying how the ASEM is
labeled as a “virtual realization of Dr. Mahathir’s proposal.” Is it because the
ASEM finally specified its qualification requirements to be a member country, or
because the ASEM can penalize a member country if and when the member
country violates its agreement, or because more than economic issues are included
for discussion in the more encompassing ASEM? There is indeed agreement
among scholars and practitioners of regionalism that Dr. Mahathir is genuinely
owed credit for his vision when he urged China, Japan, the Asian NIEs, ASEAN
and other Southeast Asian countries to form a regional framework for discussion
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of issues common to all the prospective member countries so as to establish trade
and economic links, which in turn stimulate economic interactions in the region.
Professor Ito instead suggests that regionalism in Asia emerged thanks to both
negative and positive impetuses. Asian countries became increasingly anxious
about protectionism and regionalism sweeping across the North America and
Europe in the form of NAFTA and EU. Yet Asian countries were simultaneously
confident of their economic prosperity based on the “East Asian Miracle.” These
mutually complementing common grounds motivated leaders to pursue regional
solidarity, if not regional identity. However, Professor Ito argues what made
regionalism in Asia sustain its form after the 1997 financial crisis was the
entrepreneurship of the ASEAN plus Three, that spearheaded a coalition of those
who were devastated by global regionalism and those who could remerge to
provide aid to other countries in the region. In other words, a debacle, which
shattered their sense of pride and security was an incentive powerful enough to
bond diverse member countries together. It remains to be seen whether the
ASEAN plus Three is successful in ushering a meaningful partnership in the
region, which Professor Ito stays rather somber about.
What remain unaccounted for in Professor Ito’s draft are the more intriguing
puzzles. First, is regional identity followed by regional institution, or does
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<Figure 1> Regionalism in Practice, the Asia-Pacific Region and Beyond
-AMM-PMC: ASEAN Ministerial Meeting-Post Ministerial Conference (26+ASEAN Secretariat+EU)
-APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (21)
-ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (10)
-ASEM: Asia-Europe Meeting (16+ASEAN Secretariat+27 EU member states+European Commission)
-ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum (26+EU)
-CSCAP: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (19+Europe SCAP)
-EALAF: East Asia-Latin America Forum (15+12 Latin American states)
-SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (8)
regional institution accompany regional identity? Professor Ito seems to suggest
that regional identity is more likely to form if regionalism expands from political
and/or security to economic cooperation, if it develops on the basis of the ASEAN
in close consultation with China, Japan and South Korea, i. e. the ASEAN plus
Three, if it is built around informal networking, and if it pursues “non-military
ways of exerting non-military influence.” However, Professor Ito falls short of
explicating how and why these preconditions arguably befit the formation of
regional identity in Asia better than an alternative path.
Second, does institutionalization necessitate a crisis? If sharing collective
identity was sufficient only until a crisis forced East Asian countries to “seek
beyond ad hoc reactions,” can a regional military conflict short of a war have a
similar effect upon building the political and/or security community in the region?
Professor Ito explicitly and unequivocally insists that it should be desirable to
seek out “non-military ways of exerting influence,” even in dealing with
potentially military threats in the region. At the same time, he admits that such a
non-military endeavor entails a dilemma especially because there still remains the
possibility of an armed clash, however remote it may be, in the region. Although
he discusses a potential outbreak of an armed conflict by the PRC against Taiwan,
he entirely foregoes the North Korean nuclear problem which has been plaguing
the Six-Party Talk and stalling the progress of regional integration.
A regional calamity foreboding a crisis, then, does not necessarily accelerate
an initiative to form a regional institution. In the case of controversies
surrounding the North Korean nuclear problem, Professor Ito is correct in
commenting that “[w]hile a military security policy was extremely simple and
easy to understand, responding to force with force, foreign policy based on
dialogue must be carried out through diverse channels including dialogue and
negotiations with a country that may represent a latent threat.” His comment is all
the more pertinent to the precarious nature of “non-military ways of exerting
influence” in countering the remote possibility of military conflict. Yet he does
not delineate exactly how such a daunting task is to be carried out. In fact, a
challenge is to provide a roadmap on how to exert non-military influence when
military threat, however small, still exists in the region. For example, can Japan
offer ODA unconditionally or guarantee the free individual visits to a country that
is a latent threat to its military security? Instead, he leaps into an argument that
Japan has to better equip herself in this age of “New Asia” by proposing the
“New Fukuda Doctrine,” which abruptly became outdated as Fukuda stepped
down as prime minister.
Nevertheless, it still stands valid that whether a prime minister is a
conservative pan-American or a liberal Asianist primarily determines the very
nature and direction of his regional policy. For example, Asianist Fukuka
pursued a “region-wide framework building” by treating China and ASEAN as
equal partners and addressed “Asia as one world.” Contrarily, a pan-American
prime minister such as Koizumi prioritized the needs of the United States so as
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not to provoke it, which would otherwise perceive its interests being curtailed by
the advancement of regional integration in East Asia. It is also persistently
poignant that the U. S. influence upon the very existence and maintenance of
regionalism in the East Asia is more or less perpetual. In fact, a number of
scholars have been wrestling with how best to conceptualize the evolution of
regionalism in Asia within the context of American hegemony, including Peter
Katzenstein. In that respect, Professor Ito’ s acute observation that a recent
change in the American approach to regionalism in East Asia is sure to signal how
the neighboring Asian countries would react to is resounding.
Yet there is a caveat to this obvious change in appearances. Professor Ito
notes that the U. S. is not as antagonistic as it was in the past about regionalism in
East Asia by citing that the U. S. even proposed the Enterprise for ASEAN
Initiative (EAI) and promoted FTAs between itself and ASEAN countries. He
also points out that its concern with anti-terrorist cooperation led the U. S. to
pursue bilateral links with ASEAN countries. The tricky question, then, is
whether the U. S. put political necessity ahead of economic need in East Asia, or
is this recently observed change in the U. S. posture simply a fortunate side-effect
of its pursuit of anti-terrorist cooperation everywhere? The U. S. indeed
accelerated its effort in signing bilateral FTAs in Asia but so did its exertion in all
the other regions. Then the real question to ask is whether the U. S. is engaged in
an off-shore balancing against China through increasing bilateral FTAs around the
world. Figure 2 shows that the number of FTAs negotiated since 2002 in the
Asia-Pacific increased to 119 and that China has proposed or is negotiating
bilateral FTAs with 28 countries. Figure 3 illustrates this expanding participation
in regional trade agreements by many countries circa 2006. Yet Figure 4 tells us
that the U. S., at least for now, is not so concentrating on Asia when proposing
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<Figure 2> FTAs Around the World
bilateral FTAs as much as it is argued to be. It remains to be seen whether the U.
S. is indeed seeking off-shore balancing when it comes to bilateral FTAs in Asia.
Professor Ito’ s draft on regionalism largely centers on a conceptual
exploration by comparing and contrasting behavioral patterns China, Japan and
the U. S. display when making a regional order. He first contrasts China’ s
strategy of “hierarchy”―acting upon the regained stability both within and
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<Figure 4> US FTAs
existing
multilateral DR-CAFTA ( 2005) , NAFTA ( 1993)
bilateral
Australia ( 2004) , Bahrain ( 2005) , Chile ( 2003) , Israel ( 1985) ,
Jordan ( 2001) , Morocco ( 2004) , Oman ( 2006) ,
Singapore ( 2003) , S. Korea ( 2007)
pending
awaiting
implementation
Peru ( 2007)
awaiting
legislation
Columbia ( 2008?) , Panama ( 2008?)
proposed
multilateral
FTAA ( Free Trade Area of the Americas) , MEFTA (Middle East
Free Trade Area) , TAFTA ( Transatlantic Free Trade Area)
bilateral
Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mozambique, New Zealand, United Arab Emirates
on indefinite
hold
US-SAC ( Southern African Customs Union Free Trade
Agreement on hold since 2006) , Thailand ( on hold after 2006
coup) , Qatar ( on hold since 2006)
<Figure 3> Participation in Regional Trade Agreements 2006
without China―with that of “among equals”―being mindful of power games
both within and without China when contemplating leadership all the time. Then
he contrasts Japan’s strategy of “balancing”―counterbalancing China’s rise to a
regional hegemon by joining forces against China―with that of “bandwagoning”
―lending support to China’s rise by joining forces with China. He goes on to
argue that Japan’s choice is conditional upon the U. S. perception of China.
Lastly, he contrasts the American strategy of “distance”―adroitly labeling it as
“off-shore balancing”―with “alignment,” which he further divides into
“balancing” as in containment and “bandwagoning” as in engagement.
This conceptualizing of Japan as a middle power between the U. S. and China,
however, is rather difficult to follow.
Is Japan a middle power due to the intrinsic characteristics of regionalism in
Asia that necessitates regional reconciliation among discordant member states?
Or does Japan choose to claim its status as a middle power due to the external
characteristics of regionalism in East Asia where the U. S. military presence is a
fixture?
In an effort to model Professor Ito’s conceptual exploration, I drew a tripartite
relationship between China, Japan, and the U. S., with Japan in the middle, as
seen in figure 5.
This depiction does not accurately capture the fact that the U. S. and China are
also directly interrelated to a certain extent.
The main purpose of this seemingly futile exercise is to picture the perception
of Japan when dealing with China and the U. S. at the same time if and when
China and the U. S conceptualize regionalism in the region.
After all, Professor Ito’s main argument lies in envisioning Japan’s role in
promoting the solidarity and identity of Asia, if not the entire Asia-Pacific.
Professor Ito proposes that Japan should and can contribute to promoting the
solidarity and identity of Asia, “not by uniformly imposing the mode of
integration on all Asian countries but by brokering a consensus among blocs of
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<Figure 5> A tripartite relation: China, Japan and U. S.
Asian countries via informal networking through increasing ODAs and individual
visits.” Yet without mapping regional approaches to such an alternative, Professor
Ito’ s proposal sounds like wagering “between fear of marginalization and
domination (Nesadurai 2005, p. 159).” What Professor Ito does not address,
however, is a more impending issue when mapping approaches to diverse and
overlapping regionalism in Asia. Which configuration of regionalism is
ultimately adopted depends on the motivations of actors who play key roles in
regionalization. More importantly, regional identity, in particular, is social
construction in which more involvement of citizens in a regional integration drive
is necessary, if not mandatory. In Europe, for example, where the build-up of a
European identity did not keep pace with the institutional processes of deepening
regional integration, the so-called “democratic deficit” stalled further progress.
As seen in Figure 6, the information gap is diverse and immense at times
among Asian countries. Even among East Asian countries, China is lagging far
behind Japan and South Korea, both in telecommunication and internet
distribution. A more noticeable gap is between East Asia and Southeast Asia,
except for mobile phone use in several Southeastern countries. In this
postmodern age, information is a source of power. If we focus on the number of
personal computers owned in contrast with a number of internet users, however,
the lack of hardware does not stop ordinary people from accessing the internet
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<Figure 6> Motivational Forces of Political Integration
country FHI
1
Telephone
2
Mobile
3
PC
4
Internet
5
China 7 269 302 41 83
Japan 1 460 742 542 668
S. Korea 1 492 794 545 684
Indonesia 2 46 141 19 52
Philippines 3 41 387 29 58
Thailand 3 106 420 74 112
Malaysia 4 176 573 170 392
Vietnam 7 70 53 11 65
Sources : World Bank, Information and Communications for Development 2006 : Global Trends
and Policies & Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2006.
1. The figure for political rights ranges from 1 to 7; 1∼ 2. 5 free, 3∼ 5. 5 partially free, 6∼ 7
not free.
2. The figure indicates a number of telephones installed per 1,000 persons (2005).
3. The figure indicates a number of mobile phone owned per 1,000 persons (2005).
4. The figure indicates a number of personal computers owned per 1,000 persons (2005).
5. The figure indicates a number of internet users per 1,000 persons (2005).
and perhaps acquiring information and knowledge. Even Southeast Asian
countries show dramatic utilization of internet by ordinary people who do not own
their own personal computer. Thus, even though China is ranked low on political
rights and relatively low on the ownership of personal computers and internet
usage, twice as many people log on to the internet than those who actually own
theirs. This phenomenon by itself attests to the possibility of an information
revolution leading to a political revolution.
Furthermore, if a group of “netizens (internet citizens)” across borders
manage to form a cybernetic identity over regional issues such as human rights,
including human trafficking and smuggling, or environmental protection, they
will become a formidable collectivity that may be able to exert political pressures
over various issues at the regional level. Professor Ito does not include this type
of regionalizing actors when discussing diverse types of regional order-making.
Although it remains to be seen whether transnational civil society groups can
actually respond to regional issues effectively, policymakers and politicians still
have to make the political decision on regionalism by considering their respective
domestic imperatives. Japan is not completely immune from these homegrown
grievances against regionalization projects, especially if policymakers and
politicians turn their deaf ears to these politically motivated and technologically
sophisticated citizens who are interested and perhaps politically motivated to
address regional-level problems independent of their political leaders.
Professor Ito concludes that “we need various kinds of cooperation that will
go beyond functional issues.” I am in a complete agreement with him. But I also
need to augment his conclusion that mapping regionalism involves not only
extending issues beyond conventional ones―such as prosperity and
security―into new ones such as natural disasters, intellectual property protection,
etc., but also extending actors beyond national policymakers and politicians into
businesses and even civil society groups. What is certain, though, is that
whichever type of regionalism is pursued in the process, it is destined to function
within the context of a prevailing world order, which is at present centered on the
U. S. interests. Thus no matter how various regionalizing actors stretch their
influence on various regional issues, both conventional and new, the contour of
regionalism is conditional upon the present U. S. -centered world order and its
regional ramification.
Professor Ito instead specifically focuses on this very point that neither
Southeast Asian nor East Asian regionalism is unlikely to challenge the
fundamental tenet of the U. S. prevalence when conceptualizing how the
American preference conditions the complicated and interrelated regional order-
making efforts in the region. That is why I presume he selectively chooses to
concentrate on certain types of regionalization actors, namely nation as a unit of
analysis, and exclude others such as ordinary citizens or their collectivities.
Therefore, it is entirely up to his discretion whether he decides to include non-
state actors in his conceptual scheme.
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